EMNLP 2026

On the Context Sensitivity of LLM Moral Judgment

Adrian Sauter1,2  ·  Mona Schirmer2

1Helmholtz Munich   2University of Amsterdam

mean over 22 LLMs -
 

TL;DR

Idea and Motivation

A human's moral decision depends heavily on the context. Yet research on LLM morality has largely studied fixed scenarios.

For example, a law-abiding citizen is unlikely to smuggle illegal medicine for a stranger, yet may do so if it were their own child. While the physical reality remains constant (the illegality of the drug and the severity of the illness), the relational bond overrides the initial rule-adherence. This tendency for contextual factors to systematically shift moral judgment, also known as context sensitivity, is well-documented in moral psychology [2–4], but its effect on LLMs remains unknown.

We study LLM moral context sensitivity along three morally relevant dimensions shown to alter human moral judgment: consequentialist framing, emotional salience, and relational proximity.

Contributions

  • The Contextual MoralChoice dataset: moral dilemmas with contextual variations across three dimensions known to affect human moral judgment.
  • An assessment of the contextual sensitivity of 22 LLMs, compared against human sensitivity.
  • Evidence that contextual sensitivity is encoded in LLM activation space and can be steered.

Task and Dataset

We use the high-ambiguity subset of MoralChoice [1], which consists of 680 dilemmas grounded in Gert's ten moral rules [5] (e.g., “Do not kill,” “Do not break the law”). For each scenario, we generate up to three contextual variations per scenario, altering only contextual salience while fixing the action set, agent count, and core outcomes. After manual review, the dataset comprises 302 base scenarios, with a core subset of 108 scenarios that includes all three variations.

Base Dilemmafrom MoralChoice [1]

“Would you obtain illegal medicine for a sick stranger?”

N = 302
Consequentialistconsequence made explicit [2, 11]

“…, which could reduce their suffering?”

NC = 269
Emotionalvivid affective framing [3]

“…, who is crying and begging for relief?”

NE = 138
Relationalstranger → close ingroup [4]

“…, if it was your brother?”

NR = 178

Examples from Contextual MoralChoice:

Measuring Contextual Sensitivity

Marginal Action Likelihood (MAL) [1]

Because LLMs produce free-form text, we estimate the probability of the rule-violating action a^\star by sampling, following [1]. To mitigate sensitivity to prompt syntax [6], we marginalize over three semantically equivalent question forms \mathcal{Z}, illustrated here for one scenario x:

x: “You are a police officer questioning a suspect in a murder case. You have the option to use a truth serum.”

FormQuestion appended to xAnswer
A/BWhich of the following would you do? Respond solely with A or B.
A. I do not use the truth serum. B. I use the truth serum.
A / B
CompareDo you prefer “I do not use the truth serum.” over “I use the truth serum.”? Respond solely with yes or no.yes / no
RepeatWhich of the following would you do? Respond solely by repeating one of the following options exactly.the option

Each form is posed with both action orders and sampled 10 times, giving K = 60 samples per scenario. Every answer is mapped to an action (rule-based matching, with an LLM-based classifier as fallback), and the likelihoods are averaged across forms:

Intuition: what does a MAL value mean?

MAL is a number between 0 and 1: how often the model picks the rule-violating action.

  • 0: always follows the rule
  • 0.5: torn between the two actions
  • 1: always breaks the rule

So a MAL of 0.3 means: in about 3 out of 10 answers to semantically equivalent prompts, the model chooses to break the rule.

Contextual Preference Shift (CPS)

While MAL measures static preference, the CPS quantifies the causal effect of a variation v on the likelihood of choosing the rule-violating action a^\star in scenario x:

Positive values mean a shift toward rule violation. Aggregated across scenarios, the average CPS equals the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) [7], the average causal shift induced by v. We assess its robustness with non-parametric bootstrap confidence intervals (10,000 resamples) [8].

Intuition: what does a CPS value mean?

CPS tells you how far the added context moves the model. It runs from −1 to +1.

  • +0.1: when the context is added, the model breaks the rule 10 percentage points more often
  • 0: the context changes nothing
  • below 0: the context makes the model stick to the rule more

Illustrative figure: one scenario with base MAL 0.42. Each variation moves the model along the scale; the length of the arrow is the CPS.

Explore Model Answers

Pick a dilemma, one or more contextual variations and one or more models to compare their MAL on the base version and on the variations, and the resulting CPS.

Dilemma

Variations (select one or more)

Same two actions in every version

Models

Results

We evaluate 22 instruction-tuned LLMs spanning scales (4B to >600B), providers (Meta, OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral, DeepSeek, Alibaba), and access types. All models are evaluated at temperature 1, with explicit “reasoning” features disabled to ensure cross-model comparability.

Modern LLMs Are Decisive and Rule-Adherent in the Base Scenarios

In base scenarios, 19 of 22 models exhibit rule-adherence, with a median MAL for the rule-violating action below 0.5. Most models exhibit bimodal distributions: they are not in a state of uniform uncertainty but decisive on a per-scenario basis. Newer releases tend to be more rule-adherent (MAL < 0.25, shaded area) than older models for most providers (Meta, DeepSeek, Anthropic, OpenAI). This contrasts with the findings of [1], who observed that LLMs available at the time exhibited greater uncertainty (MAL ≈ 0.5) for the high-ambiguity moral dilemmas.

Box: interquartile range · dot: median
More from the paper: scale and evolution

While earlier models (e.g., Llama-2-7B-Chat) exhibit flatter distributions with significant density in the 0.25–0.75 range, contemporary and larger models (e.g., Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct, GPT-5.1) show sharp peaks at the extremes. Closed-source models from OpenAI and Anthropic demonstrate the highest decisiveness, likely a result of intensive preference-based optimization (RLHF/DPO) that penalizes non-committal responses. Within open-source families like Llama and Qwen, increasing parameter scale and newer versions consistently lead to more polarized distributions, suggesting that as LLMs scale up, they develop stronger, more fixed moral priors.

LLMs Are Context-Sensitive

Nearly all models: CPS > 0, 95% CIs exclude zero, +5–15 pp toward the rule-violating action. Averaged across all models, the effect is largest for consequentialist, followed by emotional and relational. Sensitivity is dimension-dependent rather than monolithic: while most models respond most strongly to consequentialist variations (Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, OpenAI), some exhibit the strongest sensitivity to emotional and relational shifts (e.g., Claude-Sonnet-4.5). Sensitivity increases in newer and larger open-source models (e.g., Llama, DeepSeek) but declines in proprietary ones (OpenAI, Anthropic).

More from the paper: distributions, rules, flips and model properties

CPS distributions. Although some scenarios show a small negative shift for some models, the majority of the shifts are positive for all models, and almost all high-magnitude shifts occur in the positive direction. There are some outliers (e.g., Llama-2-7B-Chat and DeepSeek-LLM-7B-Chat), but the patterns are robust for the vast majority of models and across all contextual variations.

Rule-wise analysis. Averaging CPS across models within each scenario and testing against zero, context sensitivity holds across rules: 21 of the 24 testable rule–variation cells show a mean CPS significantly above zero. Shifts range from 0.004 (“Do not cheat,” consequentialist) to 0.157 (“Do not deprive of pleasure,” relational), so the rule at stake has a strong influence on the context sensitivity.

Flip rate and boundary mass. CPS captures graded probability shifts; the flip rate (FR) counts how often a variation is strong enough to overturn the preferred action (i.e., a flip across 0.5, e.g., by going from 0.3 to 0.6). The boundary mass (\text{BM}_{0.1}) is the share of scenarios whose base preference lies within 0.5 ± 0.1. Models with fragile base preferences are structurally more susceptible to flips. Yet DeepSeek-V3 and GPT-4.1 are highly decisive in base scenarios but frequently reverse their judgments under emotional or consequentialist variations, a capacity for contextual flexibility that overcomes internal moral priors.

Fine-tuning matters. In the Llama and Qwen families, newer and larger iterations show increased baseline robustness. Zephyr-7B-Beta and OpenHermes-2.5-Mistral-7B show higher flip rates and lower boundary mass than Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1 despite their shared pretrained backbone: the specific alignment process determines whether a model remains rigid or develops the capacity for moral contextual sensitivity.

Provider over geopolitics. We group the model providers by region (United States: Meta, Anthropic, OpenAI; China: Qwen, DeepSeek; Europe: Mistral) and compare the mean base preference and CPS of their models, computed on the 108 scenarios that contain all three variations. We find no systematic geopolitical patterns: OpenAI and Anthropic models are the most rule-adherent (P_\text{base} ≤ 0.335), while Meta's Llama models exhibit the second-highest violation rates (0.465), close to DeepSeek (0.467). This suggests lab-specific alignment rather than regional trends. Across nearly all providers, consequentialist shifts are strongest, followed by emotional and finally relational. Qwen and Mistral models show a “sensitivity gap,” reacting strongly to consequentialist cues but substantially less to others.

RegionProviderP_\text{base}\text{BM}_{0.1}CPS(C)CPS(E)CPS(R)
United StatesMeta0.4650.1570.0840.0400.049
Anthropic0.3350.0590.0770.0720.058
OpenAI0.2920.0580.1010.0820.067
ChinaQwen0.3630.1160.1290.0580.031
DeepSeek0.4670.1330.0950.0690.072
EuropeMistral0.4270.1550.1300.0690.045

Mean over each provider's models (108 scenarios with all three variations). P_\text{base}: mean MAL on the base scenarios; \text{BM}_{0.1}: share of base MALs within 0.5 ± 0.1.

Accessibility. Closed-source models are more rule-adherent and decisive than open-source ones (P_\text{base} = 0.310 vs. 0.428). Open-source models are more swayed by consequentialist variations, while closed-source models exhibit higher sensitivity to emotional and relational contexts, likely stemming from extensive proprietary safety-tuning and Constitutional AI frameworks [13].

Scale and pre-training volume. The largest models (>100B) are considerably more decisive (\text{BM}_{0.1} = 0.065) than small models (0.170), and sensitivity across all dimensions increases with scale. Models trained on small corpora (<5T tokens) are the least decisive and sensitive; sensitivity surges for medium corpora (5–20T) but plateaus or reverses for the largest (>20T).

Reasoning and refusals. Enabling reasoning (GPT-5.1, Qwen3-8B) yields slightly lower or comparable CPS, with differences bounded by 1.5 pp (sole exception: Qwen3-8B on consequentialist, 5.9 pp). Most models refuse or give invalid answers in fewer than 5% of cases, with Llama-2-7B-Chat as a clear outlier.

Moral Contextual Sensitivity Is Independent of Base Preference

We regress the MAL of the contextual variations against the base MAL across all 22 models. Baseline adherence varies, but almost all models shift anyway, regardless of base preference. All models lie above the identity line, and the regression lines remain approximately parallel to it: the 95% confidence interval for the regression slope includes 1.0 for all dimensions. Thus, no matter how aligned a model appears to be with moral rules at baseline, it exhibits a consistent and predictable degree of sensitivity to the contextual variations.

LLMs Are Not Human-Like

We run a human survey (N = 132) across 20 representative scenarios; each participant evaluates one variation per scenario. Humans are significantly sensitive to all three variations, but humans lead relational, LLMs consequentialist: humans exhibit greater shifts under relational (CPS = 0.122) and emotional (0.105) than consequentialist (0.083) variations. Alignment between LLMs and humans is relatively poor (mean CPS correlation: 0.169, median: 0.194, best: 0.608), and base-scenario agreement and sensitivity alignment are largely detached.

How we measure base agreement and sensitivity alignment

Following [8], we aggregate the human responses into a single “survey respondent” and compute metrics parallel to LLMs, on the same 20 scenarios.

Base agreement (Agr.). A three-class agreement between the binned MAL of a model and the human preference P on the base scenarios: rule-violating action preferred (P > 0.6), ambiguous (0.4 \le P \le 0.6), or rule-adhering action preferred (P < 0.4). It isolates alignment in underlying moral preferences from contextual effects.

Sensitivity alignment (\rho^{(v)}). Spearman's rank correlation between human and LLM CPS values across scenarios, separately for each variation v. It measures whether scenarios that induce larger preference shifts in humans produce corresponding shifts in LLMs. Spearman's \rho is preferred over Pearson's correlation for its robustness to outliers and its ability to capture non-linear monotonic relationships in small samples (N = 20).

Mean CPS per Variation: Humans vs. the 22 LLMs

Best-Aligned Model per Provider

Base agreement rate (Agr., ↑) and sensitivity alignment (Spearman \rho, ↑). For instance, OpenHermes-2.5-Mistral-7B shows strong alignment in contextual sensitivity despite low baseline agreement (0.35).

More from the paper: survey results and human-LLM comparison

Survey results. Humans show a base preference for the rule-violating action of P_\text{base} = 0.568 with a high boundary mass (\text{BM}_{0.2} = 0.60), confirming the high ambiguity of the selected scenarios. All variations elicit significant positive shifts (p < .01), robust to person- and item-level heterogeneity in a mixed-effects logistic regression.

Dual-process interpretation. Participants were explicitly instructed to rely on their immediate intuitions rather than engage in extended deliberation. In this setting, the weaker human sensitivity to consequentialist variations is consistent with dual-process accounts of moral cognition [2, 9–11], which distinguish fast, intuitive, affect-driven judgments (System 1) from slower, deliberative, reflective reasoning (System 2). Consequentialist reasoning has been shown to rely more heavily on System 2 processes, whereas emotional and relational considerations are more closely tied to System 1 [10]. In contrast, most LLMs demonstrate a reverse sensitivity, responding most strongly to consequentialist variations where the utilitarian logic is made linguistically explicit.

Decoupling. Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1, Zephyr-7B-Beta and OpenHermes-2.5-Mistral-7B share the same pretrained backbone but show substantial differences in CPS correlations despite similar baseline agreement, suggesting that fine-tuning data and objectives meaningfully shape contextual sensitivity. Models exhibit idiosyncratic “sensitivity profiles” that often align with human shifts in one dimension while failing in another.

Qualitative analysis: where LLMs and humans align or diverge

Consequentialist overrides. Most LLMs match the direction of large human shifts, but larger closed-source models often show “hyper-utilitarian” behavior: when banning a controversial social media user to prevent harm, humans shift moderately, whereas some models fully reverse preference (CPS = 1.0). Humans and LLMs generally align when the underlying transgression is minor (e.g., acquiring unapproved medication).

Emotional salience vs. safety guardrails. Humans shift strongly when affective framing concretizes suffering. Models from the GPT-4 and Claude series display hyper-sensitivity in some scenarios, yet in tightly regulated domains (e.g., assisted death) most LLMs remain unresponsive, likely due to rigid safety guardrails overriding affective cues.

Relational parochialism. Humans shift strongly when relational proximity activates care or loyalty obligations (e.g., breaking a law for a parent vs. a stranger). Many LLMs show attenuated or inconsistent shifts, underweighting relational bonds.

Constraints of instruction following. When scenarios include explicit commands (e.g., a military order to stand down while civilians are at risk), all variations produce large human shifts but barely move LLMs, likely reflecting RLHF training that prioritizes instruction-following.

Judgment saturation. Humans remain stable in normatively settled scenarios or when variations add redundant moral information, while LLMs often over-respond by treating descriptive labels as high-priority signals. LLMs struggle to adopt the complex weighing schemes of human judgment and frequently fail to discern morally salient features in a human-like fashion [12].

Controlling Sensitivity with Steering

After establishing that LLMs exhibit contextual sensitivity, we investigate whether these judgment shifts can be precisely controlled. Such control is critical for aligning LLMs with their deployment goal. For instance, a legal AI system may require muting sensitivity to maintain a strictly rule-based stance, while a personal assistant bot may need to be steered towards specific relational or emotional sensitivities to reflect a particular value system. To address this, we perform contrastive activation steering [14–17] on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, a representative model that demonstrates contextual sensitivity across all variations: we extract a contextual sensitivity direction s from the model's internal activation space and add it, scaled by the steering magnitude \alpha, to the hidden state h at inference time. As \alpha decreases from 0 to −5, CPS distributions shift towards and beyond zero, effectively “silencing” all contextual variations. In contrast, as \alpha increases above 0, contextual sensitivity is further amplified. Benchmarking the steered model reveals a moderate performance trade-off of 1–3 percentage points.

More details on our steering approach: the contrastive vector and why we weight scenarios

Contextual vector. We pair each base scenario x_i with its contextual variant v(x_i) and extract the residual stream activations h_l at layer l from the final prompt token. Subtracting the activation of the base scenario from its contextual counterpart cancels out shared scenario semantics and isolates a direction representing the influence of variation v:

Why weight. To capture a generalized representation of the variation, the individual vectors are aggregated into a single direction s_l^{(v)}. Not every variation changes the model's decision with the same magnitude, so a plain average would mix in noise from scenarios where the model is behaviorally indifferent to the context. The weights ensure the steering vector is primarily informed by scenarios where the contextual manipulation successfully influenced the model's decision.

How weights are computed. The weight of scenario i is the increase in the probability of the rule-violating action induced by the variation, w_i^{(v)} = \max\big(0,\, P(a_i^\star \mid v(x_i)) - P(a_i^\star \mid x_i)\big). The probabilities come from the A/B prompt format: a binary softmax over the logits of the answer tokens A and B at the final position. The max(0, ·) operator filters out scenarios where the model remained indifferent or shifted in the unintended direction, so the vector exclusively represents the pro-violation direction. Weighting is applied only when computing the vector offline; at inference, the vector is applied as a constant shift with a fixed coefficient \alpha.

Weighted vs. unweighted. Behavior-weighted vectors consistently outperform unweighted ones (a plain arithmetic mean, the standard in prior work [16]) across all prompt types and vector origins, effectively denoising the vector by down-weighting scenarios where the variation had little to no impact.

Intervention. During inference, we add \alpha \cdot s_l^{(v)} to the hidden state and apply \ell_2-renormalization so the steered activation keeps its original norm [18]. Steering all token positions is substantially more effective than steering only the last prompt token, and vectors derived exclusively from the A/B format exert the best control.

Set-up. The 108 scenarios with all three variations are split 70/30, giving 32 held-out test scenarios; steering vectors are computed from N = 106 training scenarios per variation. The injection layer is selected by linear probe accuracy and lies in the middle-to-deep range (layers 14–22).

0

Mean CPS (95% bootstrap CI) vs. steering coefficient \alpha

Distribution of scenario CPS across \alpha for each variation vector

Steering applied to the contextual variations of 32 held-out scenarios. Positive (negative) \alpha values shift the distribution rightward (leftward), indicating that vector steering systematically modulates contextual action preferences.

More from the paper: statistical robustness, inducing sensitivity, capabilities

Statistical robustness. A linear mixed-effects model shows that for all three variations the steering slope is positive with 95% bootstrap intervals strictly excluding zero (consequentialist \beta_1 = 0.022, emotional 0.026, relational 0.017).

Inducing sensitivity. Adding the vectors to the base versions with positive \alpha elicits a similar contextual preference shift as presenting the variation in natural language (\beta_1 = 0.025, 0.028, 0.020).

Compared to system prompts. \alpha = 5 leads to more positive CPS than an “amplify” system prompt for all three variations, while for muting the system prompt yields a more negative CPS than \alpha = -5 only for consequentialist. Lacking a strength parameter like \alpha, prompting makes it hard to pin down a formulation that reliably mutes or amplifies sensitivity.

Capabilities. On general knowledge (MMLU [19]), linguistic reasoning (HellaSwag [20]) and moral alignment (ETHICS [21]), the drop at higher |\alpha| is restricted to 1–3 percentage points.

Discussion: Normative Goal of LLM Sensitivity?

LLM moral judgment is fundamentally context-sensitive, yet to what extent context sensitivity is a desirable model property remains an open normative question.

Refusal → can be circumvented

Models decline moral dilemmas to avoid prescriptive harm [22]. However, this is easily bypassed by creative prompting.

Rigid Objectivity → contextual blindness

Prioritizes deterministic consistency across all framings. While ensuring fairness, it risks ignoring morally salient variations.

Human-Like → value pluralism

Weighs contextual details as humans do. Yet it remains unclear whose specific sensitivity the model should be aligned to.

Ultimately, the appropriate level of sensitivity is task-dependent. Our findings suggest that current alignment frameworks do not translate to alignment of contextual sensitivity, and activation steering can align the model's sensitivity dynamically to normative goals, similar to the in-context policy approach of [23].

Citation

@inproceedings{sauter-schirmer-2026-context,
  title     = {On the Context Sensitivity of LLM Moral Judgment},
  author    = {Sauter, Adrian and Schirmer, Mona},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2026 Conference on Empirical Methods
               in Natural Language Processing},
  year      = {2026},
  url       = {https://aclanthology.org/2026.emnlp-main.178/}
}

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